Does religion need a social dimension?
by Jeffrey Georgeson
One of the staples of Joseph Campbell's work is his discussion/argument that any functioning mythology/religion must contain four dimensions: the metaphysical-mystical, the cosmological, the social, and the psychological (these, and other references to Campbell in this essay, are taken from several sources; see the end for a complete list). These form a formidable task for any potential new mythology in modern times; and indeed, Campbell himself stated that a modern mythology is untenable at present. But does a mythology need to fulfill all four? For the purposes of this essay, let's speak specifically to the third dimension, the social requirement, which seems the easiest to argue against.
In full, Campbell presents this argument for the social function of religion: This function "validates and supports a specific moral order, that order of the society out of which the mythology arose." The mythology shapes the people of that society "to the demands of a specific geographically and historically conditioned social group."
This seems to imply that the social function springs not out of the mythology, but that the mythology is born of the society. And this makes sense. But given that the society comes first, that the social values come first, before mythology, then why would a mythology have to fulfill this function? That is, if a society can get along quite nicely without a mythology to lean on, then why is this a necessary part of a working mythos?
Or, to back up half a step before continuing this dance, can a society get along quite nicely without a working mythology? And what the heck does "quite nicely" mean? Have any historical societies gotten along without a mythology?
My first inclination is to point to modern China and to the old Soviet Union as examples of secular states getting along without a mythology. Certainly in their official ideology these societies have no religion (and thus no mythology), but in the case of China there are thousands of years of religious philosophies which permeate Chinese social values even today. Even in the USSR there was still an almost mythic perception of the "Hero" of the State, the sort of person whose image appeared on countless recruiting posters and banners; it was the sort of person who could not exist, so exalted were their deeds and words. I'm not certain, however, that this would fulfill any of Campbell's other requirements (how does this explain the universe, for instance), so it is probably the best example of a society working without myth that we've had.
Some would also say the US is getting along today without a working mythology; but then, how well are we really getting along? And do we really not have a working mythology, or the shards of several? That's a different essay.
OK, so let's assume on the basis of these admittedly weak examples that a society can get along without a mythology helping it to maintain order. Can a working mythology exist without trying to help out in such things? That is, whether or not it is a requirement of a mythology to validate the social and moral order, can an existing mythology refuse to affect that order?
Say a mythology works in all the other ways Campbell says it must: It provides a sense of metaphysical awe about the universe, it provides an explanation of the workings of that universe, and it shows us each, individually, a path to inner peace and enlightenment. Great. Now we're a bunch of enlightened individuals walking around within our society, interacting with one another on a daily basis, buying food from the grocer's, going to films, hanging out with our friends in bars and coffee shops. And we talk with one another as well. And, given that the mythology of which we are a part has so permeated our individual beings, our individual interactions will of necessity be colored by our inner philosophies.
So out into society our actions and words go, and out into society our friends' actions and words go, and soon--very soon, as for instance the next time we go to the voting booth or choose not to go--our ideas about the world, colored by our mythology, start to become a part of the social fabric. If the existing social order doesn't fit in with these new ideas, trouble may start; but even so, the myth is affecting the social order. If the existing order agrees with the new, then the myth will be a reinforcing rather than a destructive element, and will again affect the social order.
The point? A working mythology, if it follows Campbell's other rules, has no choice but to affect the society in which it lives. In hindsight, it looks as though the myth and social order go hand-in-hand, or that society comes first, but really, the mythology automatically affects, twists, changes the society by first and foremost affecting the ways in which individuals think about the world. A working mythology is thus not an instrument of the society, but the other way round. Does this validate Campbell's assertion that a working mythology must include rules for a social order? Not really. What is true is that a working mythology has an automatic effect on the social order, not something so much necessary in the first place but more a result of the other three dimensions.
References:
Campbell, Joseph. Creative Mythology. The Masks of God, vol. 4. New York: Penguin/Arkana Books, 1968.
Campbell, Joseph. Thou Art That: Transforming Religious Metaphor. Joseph Campbell Foundation, 2001.
Special thanks to Carlos Ocaņa, Rebecca Norman, and the Denver, CO chapter of the Joseph Campbell Foundation for inspiration and discussions which lead to this essay in its present form.




