Yes. I see an identity as a result of identifying something. It's like giving something a name... I don't see identity as a "what I am" but as "who I am". And I am what I control. I have direct control of my body and my body limits me, so that's where I draw the line.
Gillsing, you write that "identity [is] a result of
identifying something." I'll agree with that while noting it's a circular definition, sort of like saying that a walk is the result of walking, or an omelette is the result of cooking an omelette.
It's interesting that you use a logocentric, i.e. word-based or -centered, simile for identifying people. "It's like giving something a name." Using a figure of speech to describe the process of indentifying something in terms of giving something a name...
You follow this description with a more detailed account of the process of identifying someone and constructing an identity. Let's see how the process works.
In order to identify something you generally need to spot enough differences to distinguish that something from all the other things, and this can become more specific as you study the thing closer and for longer time. That's where identities as man/woman, human/animal/robot comes into play. When I think of "Americans" as a mass identity I pretty much include any Americans I happen to know personally in a single identity which consists of all the Americans I think exist.
I observe the use of "generally" and the "can become." The language suggests that there are exceptions to the rule. But I remain skeptical. When looking at something physical and describing its operations, we can say, "This is generally the case," and we can observe and make note of specific exceptions. If the exceptions are numerous, we can revise the rule that we thought covered the majority of cases. When dealing with words- with representation- we had best very, very careful, especially when making essentialist, i.e. "this is how people operate always and in all instances," claims. Or we had best prepare ourselves for the rhetorical equivalent of wiggling and twisting.
And it's wonderful that this category is ready-to-wear for those Americans you haven't met but think exist.
I will note that what you say here seems to contradict a later point:
Do people really identify themselves this way though? I can see how they'd use such definitions for "what am I?", but do they also use them for "who am I?" or do they just not differentiate between the two?
You were responding to my comment:
It seems to me that we use the term "identity"- when speaking of humans, at least- to describe a kind of value based on similarities and differences. "I am <of this ethnic group>." "I am <of this sexual orientation>." "I am <of this gender>." "I am <from this nation>." These are all identities, and are in no small part matters of social and self-identification.
(One can imagine that people of a given ethnicity didn't contemplate the notion of other ethnicities until they came into contact with different ethnic groups. Then the idea of difference between ethnicities became part of discussion, of identification, of definition. Same thing applies to cultural practices, assumptions about gender, codification of sexual conduct, etc. "These people are... different from us." "You ain't from around here, are ya?")
Then there's another type of identity- and this might be a matter of levels or degrees- in which a person is a combination of various things. A composite identity, if you will. "This person is <of this race-social class- educational level- gender-sexual identity-nationality>." But even this shifts according to context, with some aspects being emphasized in certain contexts, disregarded or ignored in others. "I'm this thing, but I'm also that thing, and in this context, my being that thing is more important or relevant."
If I follow your argument, you make those kinds of calls about other people. ("In order to identify something you generally need to spot enough differences to distinguish that something from all the other things, and this can become more specific as you study the thing closer and for longer time. That's where identities as man/woman, human/animal/robot comes into play.") But people don't think of themselves that way, or you're not sure on the matter. ("Do people really identify themselves this way though? I can see how they'd use such definitions for 'what am I?', but do they also use them for 'who am I?' or do they just not differentiate between the two?")
Notice that I don't call the statement "This person is <of this race-social class-educational level-gender-sexual identity-nationality>" a definition; I prefer calling it a description. (I could perhaps be persuaded to call such statements "provisional" or maybe even "operational" definitions.) I said it's a value or set of values based on similarities and differences. A map, not a territory. I stated these things belong to the domains of the social and cultural. A definition of the sort you seem to be discussing would be always true in all instances. But the words that would fill these categories are loaded and ambiguous, and the categories themselves are culturally and socially relative; they can be proven to be context-specific or case-sensitive rather than essentially "true" in some way, with the exception of something like sex. And someone might even take issue with the essentialist "definition" of a sex.
We'll return to this in a moment.
And yes, people certainly do think of themselves in those kinds of terms, and sometimes they don't differentiate between who they are and what they are (whatever those phrases mean). If you ever work in advertising, political campaigning, marketing, or certain other fields, you'll realize just how closely connected and deeply mixed up the who and the what of a person can get. I can think of at least two armed conflicts taking place because of ethnic and/or tribal tensions. Mention America in a negative way, and I'm sure someone's feelings will be hurt, or someone's anger will be provoked. And in post-Katrina New Orleans, I can assure you that the city's tensions have a lot to do with the conflation of what and who a person is and with the way a person thinks about identity, about why something bad happened to one group and why something not-as-bad happened to another group, about why the thinker went through what he or she did.
I have direct control of my body and my body limits me, so that's where I draw the line. If I merged with a building and began to directly control the whole building I might begin to think of the building as myself, and others might begin to think of the building as me too. If I ran a whole country like a dictator I might think of the whole country as me ("I am France"), at least from an international aspect.
Besides, those pesky plebs might well object to the metonymy and drag you to a date with Madame Guillotine.
The example of a tyrant raises several points, all having to do with naming and identity.
Can the identity that other people give you- the "name"- have aspects that would imply control over you? If so, it's not simply a matter of you having direct control over your own body. Consider your own use of the word "tyrant"; I doubt if many tyrants think of themselves as tyrants.
Let's work our way down from the ruler to the ruled and examine power- control- from a suitable position. Let's kneel. Let's grovel. Let's take a look at oppression from the position of the oppressed.
(It's interesting to note that you put yourself in the hypothetical position of king rather than subject. Of course, it's easier to talk about identity in terms of control by using that comparison, isn't it? The analogy implies control, and it's gendered to fit a masculinist view of power.)
If someone had an image of you- an identity for you- that placed you in a position of subordinance, of inferiority, of having fewer rights than that someone, would you say your identity is simply a matter of how you see yourself? If you were subject to verbal abuse and social exclusion, or even imprisonment and torture, as a result of someone's perception of you, would you say that your notion of your identity is as valid as the dominating individual's conception of you?
Can you reclaim or be proud of what someone else calls you? Can you say, "Yes, I'm <this>, and I'm proud of it"? Can you say, "You can't use <insert perjorative term> for me, I'm human, too"? Can you become proud of that which makes you different, regardless of whether we're talking about a social class, a sex, a gender, an orientation, an ethnic or religious minority?
Note that that part of who you are- that identity- is foregrounded in certain circumstances, e.g. if you're an African-American in a predominantly white crowd or an Arab or North African immigrant walking through a white European suburb, you might well be aware of the difference, even though that difference is historically, culturally, socially grounded.
In this context, we might think of the immigrants in
2nd Gig, of the show's backstory, and how political and cultural matters function in the show.
You might reply that accepting such an identity is a choice, that you can always reject any imposed identity and simply assert the identity that you choose. I would argue that the kinds of identities that we're discussing, the ones that are based on culture and social relationships, are rooted in history, culture, language; that you have no choice, no control over what others call you, or what they might do to you. I'd say that the choice lies with how you respond to the identity that others give you, that history has given you, that culture imposes upon you. I'd say the choice lies in your response to actions that offend, oppress, marginalize you. But those choices always come in terms of the identity, and the identity is not a choice. It's something you're born into.
That being said, one can self-identify according to the difference, thus subverting or playing with the meaning of that identity. But subversion implies there's something to be subverted, which in this case would be the identity that you've been given.
I'm saying that the imposition, the acceptance, and the use of such identities is never innocent.
I'm saying that violence can arise over a cartographers' dispute.
I would propose that if someone discriminates against you based upon your sex, your gender, your race, or any of those other identities, it's not a matter of feeling that the identity is imposed upon you; it is imposed upon you, and the imposition isn't voluntary, i.e. it's not of one's choosing. And the identities are loaded with biases.
What makes a woman different from a man? Her anatomy? Her body's chemistry? Assumptions about what being a woman means? If you met an incredibly talented and gorgeous female impersonator, would she "be" a woman because you perceive her as one? Would that male-female dichotomy collapse if you realized she had a history that doesn't quite fit binary notions of male and female, masculine and feminine, experience?
Remember Batou cracking wise about the Major's having a female body being a limitation, and how she hacked his brain and forced him to punch himself as an answer to his comments.
Think of the history of light-skinned African-Americans "passing" as white, or of white prostitutes in the Storyville red light district advertising themselves as one-eighth, one-nine, one-sixteenth black in order to charge white customers more, as predominantly white patrons fetishized "blackness", but only as a thing to visit, not as a thing to marry. What does this say about race?
Perhaps that it, too, is a socially and culturally constructed thing, and something that can be undermined only in terms of its own assumptions about appearances, categories, identities?
I wrote:
It seems to me that we use the term "identity"- when speaking of humans, at least- to describe a kind of value based on similarities and differences. "I am <of this ethnic group>." "I am <of this sexual orientation>." "I am <of this gender>." "I am <from this nation>." These are all identities, and are in no small part matters of social and self-identification.
I also stated:
"This person is <of this race-social class- educational level- gender-sexual identity-nationality>." But even this shifts according to context, with some aspects being emphasized in certain contexts, disregarded or ignored in others.
By which I meant that we are born into linguistic, cultural, political, social systems. If we live in a heterogeneous society, we can't help but think of ourselves as white, black, male, female, gay, straight, etc. when we come into contact with those who are different from us. Our languages- our cultural backgrounds- gift us with these differences. And we self-identify according to those differences. But the self-identification becomes more pronounced according to our surroundings. (See my examples above, an African-American surrounded by whites, or an Arab or North African in an affluent European suburb.) We can subvert or play with assumptions about those identities. (See the other examples I've given, the flawless female impersonator and people passing as members of a given race.)
Which brings us back to the idea of an identical copy of a particular human being.
you'll have to enter the domain of "should" and leave the area of "would"
With regard to the notion of rights, I used "would" and "could". You can use "should" and I would encourage you to do so, as it reveals exactly where you stand on the matter. These were my questions:
Would this shape the copy's legal/moral rights in relation to those of the original? Could those rights be taken away, even though the copy is "identical" to the original, simply because people decide the copy, although identical to the original in every respect, doesn't have the same identity as the original and therefore doesn't have the same rights?
And notice that my scenario had nothing to do with the copy engaging in wrongdoing. I simply asked what would happen, what the ethical and legal status of the copy would be. Again, I find no direct answer in your comments:
There are already laws that regulate various legal identities and determine what they can and cannot do. If a perfect copy of you existed, the rights to this forum account would go to whoever changes the password first.
As I was inquiring about the legal identity and status of an entity that doesn't exist as yet, and as I was pretty clearly referring to something like "human rights" or "rights before the law", I don't quite see the relevance of your example. There's a difference between, say, the right to access a forum account and somebody's rights as a citizen of a nation or as a human being. I'll admit that they're related, but I think the latter (citizenship, human rights) are of more concern than the former (accessing a forum). With due respect to the management and community here, I'd be more worried about imprisonment than I'd be about losing access to this site; I don't like jail cells. I was asking what people think such a copy's rights might or should be, which is why I used the example of a copy unwittingly entering the country as an original.
You don't have to bring perfect copies into this. Ever heard of identity theft? Ever heard of people being deported because someone found out that they don't really have the right to live in a country? Laws are laws, and they can lead to a lot of nastiness.
Actually, I didn't bring perfect copies into it. That would be someone else...
I was merely responding to
that person. Or to the copy of that person, or the person pretending to be the person in question.
Identity theft laws apply to people masquerading as other people. The situation I postulated is this:
If the copy is developed offshore and enters the country thinking it is a U.S. citizen, is it a citizen of the U.S., if the original was a citizen of the U.S.? Or would the copy have to be deported, as it wasn't "born" on U.S. soil and, in this example, crossed the border into the U.S. thinking it was a U.S. citizen? Would it fall under the same laws that cover animals smuggled into the country? Would the action constitute entering the country under an assumed identity?
You imply that the copy's identity would be decided by "people", by which I assume you mean humans who aren't copies or copies that don't know they're copies. But you've also drawn a comparison between the copy's act of entering the country in good faith and identity theft. Identity theft, as I said, requires intent, and as the law stands, one can't steal one's own identity; therefore, the thief would have to be someone other than you, different from you. And a copy is in the same position as the thief, you seem to be saying, if folks decide that's the way things are. But the copy in my scenario doesn't know it's stealing anything; it thinks it's the person who's a citizen. So I don't see how the people could make that particular accusation stick.
Similarly, a copy that doesn't know it's not a citizen is in a different position from an illegal immigrant. The comparison between the copy's situation and that of someone who suddenly discovers that documentation, etc. is not enough to prove citizenship, who discovers that he or she might be deported due to a bureaucratic oversight, seems more relevant to the proposed situation. (I'm thinking of those rare but unfortunate examples in which somebody believes he or she is a citizen of a country, but it turns out the person doesn't meet and never met the requirements of citizenship.) Perhaps you'd care to elaborate upon that.
Your position on the copy's status takes no heed of the copy's wishes or needs:
It's only when the status as a copy is revealed that people will be able to re-identify the copy and either let it keep the original identity or identify it as a new entity, perhaps with less social/legal value.
Given that current laws do not provide for a situation in which a copy that doesn't know it's not you acts as if it's you, I'm not sure what your point is, unless you're saying that folks will be able to determine the legal status of such a copy once its existence is known to everyone. And if you're saying that the copy's status, when discovered, should be decided by people "who can make up their own minds" about what the copy is and how it should be treated, that seems more than a bit solipsistic and morally problematic, especially in light of what I've mentioned about oppression and naming.
"When others know the copy to be a copy, it's up to others to decide what to do with it," you seem to be saying.
A perfect copy that didn't know it was a copy would be of a different order from an identity thief; it would be different in kind. So the subject of identity theft isn't quite germane to the matter at hand. In fact, I could argue that according to your reasoning, if we equate identity thieves with copies, so long as no one knows you're using a stolen identity- say, if you're using someone's credit card to buy CDs- those people will treat you as if you're that person, and it won't matter unless you're caught. Perhaps you could decide to be the person whose credit card you've stolen. After all, identity is like naming.
Let's continue with this. As long as the companies from whom you're buying stuff get paid- say, if the victim decides to pay the bills in order to keep his or her credit history clean, and doesn't want the hassle of wading through a credit card company's bureaucracy- the only folks with a right to dispute would in fact be the thief and the victim.
In which case, you could resort to dueling rather than appeal to the courts, I suppose.
In short, the ethical messiness and social implications dissolve in a cloud of self-interest and vague definitions.
Or was that cordite from a pair of pistols, smokeless, leaving nothing but traces of itself and the duelists' bodies and the blood?
Then we have the equation with stem cells. You seem to be saying that the copy and the stem cells are equivalent, or that Americans would take the two things to be the same, or that your position is more valid because... I don't know? You support embryonic stem cell research?
This is where you have to ask yourself: WWJD? Except it wouldn't be the regular Jesus, it'd be the golden bearded Aryan Jesus, wrapped in his American flag and armed with his M-16+. Or in other words, how do you think USA will treat perfect copies when they start turning up? As illegal entities which should be destroyed perhaps? Apparently that's what's done with cells left over from failed fertility treatments.
I assume this is an example of the "mass identity" of which you spoke:
When I think of "Americans" as a mass identity I pretty much include any Americans I happen to know personally in a single identity which consists of all the Americans I think exist.
But, to judge by your own words, it's not really much of an identity:
But it's just a convenient construct in my mind, and each an every American will still identify themselves as whoever they usually identify themselves as.
Knowing that your definition of identity provided you with enough room to wiggle out of the domain of the offensive and the ad hominem, I ask: Are you arguing that an exact copy of a human being would be equivalent to stem cells in some ontological way, or is this simply what you believe Americans would think about the issue?
Or are you saying that Americans are just dumb and reactionary and anti-intellectual, but they aren't
really dumb and reactionary and anti-intellectual; that's just the convenient construct you have of Americans, the category you've posited for Americans, the identity that's not really their identity?
Or were you attempting to make a joke?
If I reframed the question and the copy attempted to enter, say, Nigeria or Belgium or Russia or Saudi Arabia or Thailand or Honduras with documents indicating it was a citizen of the relevant country, if it didn't know it was a copy, would that change the way you interpreted and responded to the question? If so, why?
Such is the soul in the body: this world is like her little turf of grass, and the heaven o'er our heads, like her looking-glass, only gives us a miserable knowledge of the small compass of our prison. - Bosola, in John Webster's The Duchess of Malfi